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Six Years On and Still Counting:
Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess
Robert Hockett*
Six years after reaching their bubble-era peaks and then plunging, U.S.
primary and secondary real estate and mortgage markets remain one of the
principal drags upon economic recovery. As many as 12 million new
mortgages face foreclosure in the coming six years, assuming no further price
declines—which cannot be safely assumed owing to symbiotic linkages
between home prices and macroeconomic performance. Why do we remain
in self-perpetuating slump? The answer is exceedingly complex thanks to
the large number of causal factors in play. This Article catalogues and
imposes order upon these mutually interacting factors by first identifying the
principal interests at stake and the principal constituencies that hold these
interests. The Article then identifies an overlapping convergence of interests
among most constituencies. The Article then proceeds to identify all of the
principal impediments to satisfaction of the convergent interests identified.
It finds that the most important impediments are rooted in collective action
challenges that authorized collective agents could surmount. Next, the
Article identifies and assesses alternative means that collective agents can
employ to remove the mentioned impediments. The principal conclusion
reached is that municipalities exercising their eminent domain powers in
partnership with investors are best situated to move the nation out of its
ongoing mortgage mess.

* Professor of Enterprise-Organizational, Finance-Regulatory, and International
Economic Law, Cornell Law School; Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York;
Fellow, The Century Foundation; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University;
B.A., J.D., University of Kansas. Many thanks to Dan Alpert, Neil Buchannan, Michael
Campbell, Mike Dorf, Robert Frank, Laurie Goodman, Howell Jackson, Lynn Lopucki, Nouriel
Roubini, Sherle Schweninger, David Skeel, Lynn Stout, Bob Summers, Joe Tracey, John
Vlahoplus, and participants in workshops held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The
Century Foundation, and the New America Foundation. Opinions, errors, and the like are all
for present purposes my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THERE MUST BE SOME KIND OF
WAY OUT OF HERE 1
Six years after reaching their bubble year peaks and then
plunging, U.S. primary and secondary mortgage and real estate
markets remain one of the principal drags upon economic recovery.2
Notwithstanding signs of improvement in some localities, the S&P
Case Shiller 20 City Index shows home prices down 7.5 percent from
their previous post-bubble high, itself low in relation to trend,
reached in May of 2010. 3 Meanwhile a backlog of nearly 400,000
homes awaited liquidation at the end of 2011, with another 2.86
million mortgages 12 or more months delinquent. 4 The upshot is a
current “shadow inventory” of some 3.25 million homes either
already foreclosed or on the brink of foreclosure—an inventory that
weighs heavily on home prices, families, and the nation’s economy
alike.
In light of these trends, real estate analysts estimate that between
7.4 million and 9.4 million additional home loans are now in danger of
default over the next six years—an impending foreclosure tsunami of
unprecedented proportion. 5 This assumes no further price declines or
interest rate rises.
Owing to feedback effects, however, further price declines
cannot realistically be assumed away. 6 Homeowners who live under
1. With warm thanks and apologies to the bard, Robert Zimmerman, for a most evocative
bit of poetry of the ensuing couple of lines: “There must be some kind of way out of here, / said
the joker to the thief, / There’s too much confusion; / I can’t get no relief.” I hope both that I
am neither joker nor thief. Bob Dylan, “All Along the Watchtower” (Columbia Records 1967).
2. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Daniel Alpert & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward:
Moving Past the Post-Bubble, Post-Best Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness,
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (Jan. 12, 2012), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139. See also FED. RESERVE
BOARD, The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations, Jan. 4, 2012,
available at www.federalreserve.gov/ publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper20120104.pdf; Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010)
[hereinafter Hockett I]; Robert Hockett, Bail-Outs, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36
(2009) [hereinafter Hockett II].
3. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note 2, at 3. See also William C. Dudley,
Housing and the Economic Recovery, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Jan. 6, 2012),
www.newyorkfed.org/ newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html.
4. See, e.g., Laurie Goodman et al., The Case for Principal Reductions, 17 J. STRUC. FIN.
29 (2011). See also Gus Lubin, Laurie Goodman on Why Another 11 Million Mortgages Will
Go Bad, BUS. INSIDER (July 26, 2011), www.articles.businessinsider.com/2011-0726/markets/
30092548_ 1_shadow-inventory-default-rates-loans.
5. See, e.g., Goodman et al., supra note 4; Lubin, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note
2; Dudley, supra note 3 for support of the claims made in this paragraph. For more on feedback
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debt overhang usually don’t spend money, which slows growth.
Because homes represent the largest store of wealth for the American
middle class, and because the middle class represents the greatest
source of American consumer demand, this drag on the economy is
massive. Our foreclosure tsunami is accordingly apt to prove selfworsening. Mass foreclosures depress home prices, which depress
consumer expenditures, which depress employment and income,
which heighten the incidence of default and foreclosure, which
depresses home prices yet further.
Certainly, Congress, the Obama Administration, the Federal
Reserve, and multiple U.S. states have tried multiple programs both
to keep families in their homes and to hasten a return to full health in
the mortgage markets and the broader U.S. economy. 7 Why, then,
are we still in slump? The answer is exceedingly complex due to the
large numbers of causal factors in play.
This Article aims to catalogue and impose order upon the large
number of mutually interacting factors now underwriting continued
uncertainty and slump in the mortgage markets. Doing so will serve
to render this tangled problem both more tractable and, therefore,
more soluble. Sorting out the distinct but interacting challenges and
tracing their interactions should enable us better to map out distinct
but complementary solution strategies responsive to each distinct
factor.
Part II of the Article identifies the principal interests at stake in
the mortgage market troubles, as well as the principal constituencies
that hold these interests. That assists both normative and political
feasibility analysis of alternative solutions. Part III identifies an
overlapping convergence of interests among most constituencies,
including the public. That affords hope that a politically feasible
solution that benefits all or near all can indeed be developed. Part IV
identifies the principal impediments to mortgage market recovery.
Part V identifies and assesses alternative means by which to remove
or diminish the mentioned impediments. A Conclusion then looks
ahead to next steps, while an Appendix summarizes the Article’s
principal factor and causal-relational findings in schematic,
“flowchart” form.
In view of the disproportionate importance of coordination and
collective action challenges in blocking progress in solving the
effects of the sort that figure prominently in this Article—a sort that I label “recursive collective
action problems,” see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author); Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay in
Constructive Retrieval (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Working Paper No. 82, 2011).
7. For details of these and other programs, see Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2;
FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note 2; Dudley, supra note 3.
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mortgage crisis thus far, the Article concludes that what it calls
“controlling mortgage bloc assembly” presents the most important
next step. That is a step which the Author has urged upon federal
instrumentalities since 2008, but which is most likely now to be taken
by municipalities exercising their eminent domain power in
partnership with investors.

II. INTERESTS AND CONSTITUENCIES
To remain clear about what is at stake and politically feasible as
we sift through the mortgage mess, this part identifies seven principal
interests and five constituencies to consider.
A. INTERESTS

1. Maximization of Mortgage Loan Value Received, Ideally Up to
the Full Amounts Owed, and of the Value of Underlying Collateral
Mortgage loans are contractual in character, and lenders expect
and desire to receive all or as close as possible to what they are
contractually owed, with well-preserved collateral-mortgaged homes,
serving as backup. In ordinary times, most borrowers do pay what
they owe, and so lenders need not resort to foreclosure on collateral.
The present time is not ordinary, however, and lenders accordingly
hope to receive as close to what they are owed as possible, in the form
either of payment, of attached collateral, or both. This is true
whether we speak of lenders in primary and secondary markets, or
about the first lien or second lien holders. 8

8. Lenders in “primary” markets are those who hold repayment rights on loans that they
have originated and held. Lenders in “secondary” markets—including the markets for
securitized mortgages and associated mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”)—are those who have
acquired repayment rights from primary lenders. “First” lien holders are creditors with priority
over other rights-holders to payments made by borrowers. “Second” lien holders are creditors
lacking in such priority. Creditors with distinct priorities, notoriously, face collective action
problems in the vicinity of borrower insolvency. That fact will prove important below, and so
will the collective action challenges faced by first lien holders when loans are pooled and
scrutinized. Take “interest” to mean legitimate interest throughout.
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2. Maximization of Mortgage Loan Value Remitted, Ideally Up to
the Full Amounts Owed, and of the Value of Underlying Collateral
While this interest is materially identical to interest II.A.1, 9 we
consider it here from the borrower’s rather than the lender’s point of
view. 10 In some settings, borrowers’ and lenders’ points of view can
diverge, though they do not always diverge in the degree or manner
that some might suppose in the present environment.
Borrowers generally wish to pay all or as close as possible to
what they owe 11, as well as to preserve the values of the homes that
they purchase with borrowed funds. Presently, however, where many
borrowers are unemployed or under-employed and many homes are
market-valued at less than what borrowers owe, mortgagors hope to
pay less than the face values of their loans. Most realistically minded
lenders would be content with that, too. 12

3. Expedition of Fair, Efficient, and Reliable Mortgage Loan
Foreclosure, Collateral-Attachment, and Collateral-Sale Proceedings:
“Expeditious Mortgage Loan Foreclosure Proceedings”
Ordinarily, nobody wishes to see lenders attach and foreclose on
the collateral securing borrowers’ obligations on a mass scale.
Lenders are in the business of lending and investing, not home or
other collateral-maintaining or selling. When mass foreclosure is
unavoidable, there is a presumable interest that proceedings proceed
fairly and efficiently. 13
Notwithstanding that fact, there can be substantial disagreement
over when indeed “unavoidability” kicks in. In this connection, one
prospect that emerges below is that many seemingly unavoidable
foreclosures are in fact theoretically avoidable, in manners that satisfy
9. Interests II.A.1. and II.A.2. are satisfied by the same actions, and thus materially
equivalent.
10. See also Interest II.A.7., infra, which concerns retention of homes by their purchasers.
11. A wish not to repay the loan amount is not a cognizable interest for legal or policy
purposes and because the general reliability of debt contracts is in the interest of all as it keeps
down borrowing costs.
12. The fact that it is not happening notwithstanding this desire suggests formidable
coordination and collective action problems, a suggestion that we shall find corroborated below.
13. Criminals, sociopaths, and some orthodox welfare economists may argue that no one
who benefits by unfairness has an interest in fairness, just as they may argue that borrowers do
not have an interest in paying back their debts. But to treat others unfairly is not cognizable as
interests for purposes of legal or public policy analysis, any more than are the “interests” of
criminals in avoiding prosecution. See Robert Hockett, Pareto versus Welfare (Cornell Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-031, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1309699. See also Robert
Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and
Policy, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 391 (2009).
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both interests II.A.1. and II.A.2., if only certain coordination and
collective action problems that now afflict the primary and secondary
mortgage markets can be collectively addressed. That fact will figure
prominently in the proposals laid out in Part V.

4. Minimization of Transaction Costs Occasioned By Mortgage
Finance, Refinance, and Foreclosure Arrangements
All transactions occasion costs. Transacting parties generally
prefer to minimize such costs. Where the transaction costs are fees
paid to various “service” providers, on the other hand, some parties
prefer that they be maximized. That fact as well figures importantly
below.

5. Maintenance of Safety, Soundness, Fairness, Efficiency, Health
and Stability of U.S. and Global Financial Institutions and Markets,
Hence of the Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Markets:
“Maintenance of the Health of the U.S. and Global Financial
Markets”
Since the mid-1990s at latest, residential mortgage-backed
securities (“RMBS”) have come to constitute a very large segment of
the U.S. and indeed global securities markets. 14 The reasons are
many. For one thing, at least until recently these instruments were
widely and indeed plausibly viewed as safe investments for parties
seeking relatively modest but reliable returns. For another thing,
their popularity itself, stemming both from their safety and from their
relative novelty in the years immediately following their introduction,
rendered them higher-return investments for a lengthy period of time
as accelerating purchases drove up their market prices. Finally, the
aforementioned features rendered them particularly popular for
purposes both of baby boomer pension fund diversification and of
serving as collateral for burgeoning repo markets. Hence their
importance to financial markets and the institutions that operate in
them.
But this means that RMBS also implicate the long recognized
interest in safety, soundness, fairness, efficiency and stability on the
part of the mentioned institutions and markets, the latter in turn
serving as predicates to sound and stable macroeconomic growth
featuring full employment and low-to-moderate borrowing costs.
Hence the interest in primary and secondary mortgage markets is an
14. See, e.g., Hockett I, supra note 2, in support of the claims made in this and the following
paragraph; see also Hockett II, supra note 2.
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interest not only in housing, but also in generalized macroeconomic
health. It also bears noting that well functioning RMBS markets
lower borrowing costs for would-be homeowners. 15 That was part of
the point of the Hoover and Roosevelt era innovations to the
American system of mortgage finance over the course of the 1930s—
the decade that brought us FHA, FHA mortgage insurance, the 30
year fixed rate mortgage, and the first GSE—Fannie Mae. This
system functioned quite well over its first 70 years prior to the bubble,
converting the nation from one in which fewer than 40 percent of
households owned their own homes, to one in which nearly 70
percent did. We shall accordingly treat restoration of that state of
health that the mortgage finance industry enjoyed prior to the bubble
as one possible component of interest II.A.5.

6. Maintenance of Traditional State and Local From Federal
Jurisdiction Over Agency, Commercial, and Real Property Law
Matters in the U.S.
The U.S. is a federated republic, comprising multiple states that
are themselves taken as loci of sovereignty. Moreover, most U.S.
states have “home rule” statutes, pursuant to which many spheres of
authority are formally recognized as properly vesting in municipalities
whose organs of government are closer, and in consequence more
immediately responsive to the wishes of their populations. 16
This overall scheme of governance, as the U.S. counterpart of the
familiar European and Roman Law principle of “subsidiarity,” can be
understood both in political-theoretic and in orthodox economic
terms. Politically, it coheres well with the American ideal of popular
sovereignty, inasmuch as the greater responsiveness thought to inhere
in smaller units of government is responsiveness to the “will of the
people” itself. Economically, subsidiarity figures as an informationand agency-cost reducer, precisely by dint of its minimizing the space,
hence the slack, that might otherwise open between community needs
on the one hand, the instrumentality charged with satisfying those
needs on the other hand. There is, then, a longstanding interest,
justifiable on multiple grounds, in maintaining the greatest degree of
state and municipal responsibility for policy-formulation and program
execution—sometimes lumped together under the rubric of “the
police power”—as is consistent with federal authority over matters of
truly national concern.
That is arguably the case, on the
15. For more on matter discussed in this paragraph, see Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian
Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2006) [hereinafter Hockett III].
16. See, e.g., LYNN BAKER & CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 36 (2004).
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aforementioned political-theoretic and economic grounds, in any
nation. But it also is legally the case in the U.S., the Constitution of
which embodies the principle both in its structure and in many of its
specific provisions.

7. Maintenance of as Many Homeowners in Their Current Homes as
is Practicable17
In view of the many costs, traumas, and other harms to
homeowners, their families, their communities, and the local, state,
and national economies more generally occasioned by mass
foreclosure and eviction, there is of course a considerable interest in
keeping as many willing current home-owners in their homes as is
possible. There is documentation aplenty cataloguing the many costs
in personal suffering, familial instability, interrupted childhood
education, depressed housing quality and home-values, elevated
crime rates, and other social ills—including reduced consumer
demand and consequent economic slump themselves—occasioned by
widespread housing foreclosure. There is accordingly a significant
interest in keeping as many people in their homes, when they wish
thus to stay, as is practicable. This interest, however, can rest in some
tension with some of the other interests catalogued above, in
particular interests II.A.3. and II.A.4. under some scenarios.
B. CONSTITUENCIES

1. Mortgage Lenders/Investors
Mortgage lenders/investors (“investors”) are one class of
constituents whose interests are implicated by the ongoing challenges
in our mortgage markets. We can partition this class into three
subclasses, whose interests sometimes diverge, particularly in the
vicinity of borrower insolvency. The first subclass is that of first lien
holders who hold undivided interests in mortgage promissory notes
and the mortgages that secure them. The classic, pre-securitization
era bank or thrift mortgage lender is of this type, a type characterized
by the one loan, one holder formula. The loans in such cases are
often called “portfolio” loans.
The second subclass of mortgage investor is that of first lien
holders who hold divided interests in mortgage notes and the
mortgages that secure them. The prototypical example is someone
17. Sometimes Parts II.A.2. and II.A.7. are conjoined, the conjunction being dubbed “stay
and pay.”
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who holds interests in a pool of loans, in which others likewise hold
interests. The interests in such cases are typically mortgage-backed
securities (“MBS”), and each mortgage loan underlying the MBS
issued by a particular pool is held, in effect, by multiple persons.
Where the MBS is associated with underlying residential real estate,
it often is called an “RMBS.”
The third subclass of mortgage investor is that of second lien
holders, who are able to claim on borrowers only after first lien
holders have been paid. For present purposes, it does not matter
whether the second liens are held in portfolio or securitized form.
What matters is that the different priorities in bankruptcy enjoyed by
first and second lien holders underwrite an important potential
conflict of interest between them.

2. Mortgagors / Mortgage Borrowers
Mortgagors/mortgage borrowers (“borrowers”), to whom we will
sometimes refer as “mortgagors” or “debtors,” are the second class of
constituents. Borrowers are those who owe on the promissory notes
that residential real estate mortgages secure. While the interests of
members of this class largely converge, it is helpful to partition this
class into three subclasses.
The first subclass of borrowers comprises those who purchased
their homes during the bubble years and now find their mortgages
“underwater.” Having borrowed at fixed rates to purchase homes
that appreciate or depreciate in value at variable rates, these
borrowers now find that they owe more than their homes are worth.
This subclass of borrower is salient for several related reasons. First,
underwater mortgages are difficult to refinance in private credit
markets at lower interest when interest rates fall. Second, “walkaway” or “strategic default” is economically rational in respect of
these mortgages. Third, many of these mortgagors reasonably feel
swindled by the unforeseen collapse in real estate markets, over
which they had no control, and sometimes find “walk-away” not only
expedient, but just. Finally, underwater mortgages default at a much
higher rate than others, meaning that they pose the greatest drag of
all on recovery in the mortgage markets and the economy at large.
The second subclass of borrowers comprises those who face
temporary difficulty in keeping current on mortgage payments owing
to temporary unemployment or underemployment. Mortgagors in
this subclass are faced with foreclosure even when they were model
borrowers prior to an unemployment or underemployment event, and
even when they might well be reemployed and well able to resume
their mortgage payments within as few as, say, 90 or 120 days. And
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this is so whether or not the mortgagor in this subclass is obligated on
an underwater mortgage. As if all of this were not challenge enough,
creditors, still spooked in the wake of the crash, hesitate to offer
bridge loan assistance to borrowers who face it—particularly in view
of the not-privately-capturable positive externalities it would
generate. In this sense there is a classic “missing market” for bridge
loan assistance, a fact I exploit elsewhere. 18
Finally, a third subclass comprises borrowers who would unlikely
have owned their own homes but for the unusually easy credit
available during the bubble years. Many of these borrowers were
encouraged to aspire to ownership rather than rental precisely
because home values were rising so quickly that, it was thought, they
could readily refinance low front-end “teaser rate” mortgage loans on
the strength of the appreciating collateral, prior to the higher
“balloon” rates’ kicking in. Many of these borrowers will likely have
to return to renting, even if in some cases “renting to own.” We will
revisit that prospect below.

3. Mortgage Servicers
The business of securitized real estate finance in the U.S. has
featured a well-developed division of labor for several decades. One
specialization is the mortgage loan servicers (“servicers”), primarily
banking institutions, which collect payments from borrowers and
transfer them to lenders. Where commercial real estate is financed,
there are important distinctions between subcategories of servicer,
particularly among so-called “master,” “primary,” and “special”
servicers. In residential real estate finance, by contrast, such further
differentiation is rare. We shall see shortly that the lack of such
distinctions is a pity, and in need of change. The securitized RMBS
markets can benefit by replicating certain attributes of the
commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) markets.
While the paucity of “special” servicers in the residential real
estate mortgage finance industry is one problem to which we’ll
attend, another has to do with the technologies that the industry
employs. It is difficult to examine the recent dysfunctions that have
afflicted the foreclosure process over the past several years without
concluding that the servicing industry’s infrastructure has been better
suited to environments in which mortgage defaults are rare—as
indeed they were before 2007—than environments in which they
occur in abundance. More of this below.
18. Sometimes Parts II.A.2. and II.A.7. are conjoined, the conjunction being dubbed “stay
and pay.”

HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2013

3/31/2013 11:29 PM

SIFTING THROUGH THE MORTAGE MESS

383

4. The Federal Government, Principally in the Name of the U.S.
Citizenry or General Public.
Insofar as our ongoing mortgage and real estate market slumps,
and the attendant macroeconomic slump to which they still stand in
symbiosis, are national problems, one can speak of “the nation” as a
party in interest. I shall accordingly sometimes speak of “the Federal
Government” or “the citizenry” or “general public” as a party in
interest, and include under this designation various federal agencies
and instrumentalities as agents—notably the Federal Reserve
(“Fed”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), the mortgage-bundling
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and the GSEs’ federal overseer known as the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (“FHFA”). Insofar as the general public or salient
sectors thereof are faced with collective action challenges, the
mentioned instrumentalities, including the Federal Government, are
those collective agents who are best positioned to implement the
workable solutions I later propose.19
The Federal Government—through the Department of Treasury,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY” or “New York
Fed”), and the presently government-held GSEs—is also an Investor
in more or less the Part II.B.1. sense.
One strategy these
instrumentalities employed to place a bottom beneath plunging MBS
markets in 2008 was to purchase and hold substantial portfolios of
MBS. Even as their primary interests were pro bono publico, I will
treat these instrumentalities principally as acting in the name of the
U.S. public.
Other agencies or associated entities of the Federal Government
that bear responsibility for financial regulation and/or real estate
matters—for example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), the FDIC, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”),
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the
FHFA, the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, etc.—likewise bear
interests that complementary to those of the Federal Government.

5. State Functionaries, in the Names of Their States
There is also space for a constituency of state functionaries
operating in parallel to the Federal Government. Those functionaries
19. For more on the need of collective agency to which collective actions give rise, see
Hockett I, supra note 2; Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, 35 CORNELL LAW FORUM
14 (Cornell Law Sch., Ithaca, N.Y.) Spring 2011.
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will presumably act in the interests of the citizens of their states.
While they will not be indifferent to the interests of the nation or to
the interests of Federal Government functionaries, and vice versa,
there is nevertheless, some divergence in their interest.

III. CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICT AMONG
INTERESTS AND CONSTITUENCIES
We can now provisionally correlate the interests catalogued in
Part II.A. with the constituencies catalogued in Part II.B. The
interests of Investors, Borrowers, and the Federal Government are on
the whole convergent, with some divergence between first and second
This cluster of interests
lien holders among the Investors. 20
potentially diverges, on the other hand, from the interests of some
Servicers 21 and, potentially but to lesser degree, some State
Functionaries.
A. INVESTOR INTERESTS
Investors aim to maximize mortgage loan values (II.A.1.)—to
maximize loans’ or collateral homes’ expected values (“EVs”)—on
reliable and predictable schedules, via Borrower Repayment (II.A.2.)
or expeditious foreclosure-and-resale (II.A.3.), at minimal transaction
cost (II.A.4.). They also wish to see stable financial markets (II.A.5.).
Finally, Investors wish to see borrowers stay in their homes (II.A.7.),
since investors are in the business of lending rather than that of
maintaining or selling real estate.
B. BORROWER INTERESTS
Borrowers aim to maximize the mortgage loan value remitted
(II.A.2.)—to maximize collateral home and loan EVs—on reliable
and predictable schedules, at minimal transaction cost (II.A.4.). Also,
at least ex ante, Borrowers want there to be expeditious foreclosure,

20. Discussion on some intra-constituency conflicts of interest infra.
21. Servicers of securitized residential mortgage loans, at any rate. Matters are different
where Servicers of securitized commercial mortgage loans are concerned, in that the “special”
Servicers in that industry hold interests that complement those of Investors, Borrowers, and the
Federal Government.
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collateral-attachment, and collateral-sale procedures in place
(II.A.3.), in order that real estate markets and home prices, be kept
stable and interest rates, hence borrowing costs be kept low (II.A.5.).
Finally, Borrowers wish to be able to remain in their homes rather
than to be evicted in the event of default or delinquency (II.A.7.).
C. SERVICER INTERESTS
Servicers aim to maximize servicing revenue, and hence desire to
keep transaction costs low (II.A.4.). There are many arrangements
for Servicers’ compensation. Currently, such arrangements misalign
Servicer incentives on the one hand, Investor and Borrower
incentives on the other. I shall assess alternative, more incentivealigning compensation arrangements below.
D. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The U.S. Federal Government aims to maintain healthy financial
markets and a well functioning macroeconomy (II.A.5.). To do so, it
must promote solvency and confidence among the principal mortgage
market
participants—namely,
Investors,
Borrowers,
and
intermediating institutions—by facilitating the reliable performance
of mortgage contracts where possible, or maximizing home and
mortgage loan EVs (including through legitimate foreclosure) where
full performance is not possible (II.A.1., II.A.2., II.A.3., II.A.4.). The
Federal Government also presumably favors the prospect of helping
borrowers keep their homes in the interest of community and local
economy (II.A.7.). Finally, at present, the Federal Government also
is itself a Lender of Last Resort (“LLR”) “Investor” in the
(secondary) mortgage markets, with interests that attend that status. 22
E. STATE FUNCTIONARIES’ INTERESTS
State functionaries aim to maintain as much traditional state
jurisdiction over agency, commercial, and real property law matters
as possible (II.A.6.), while presumably also being sympathetic to the
22. As Investor, while the Federal Government is not solely concerned with its “bottom
line,” it is not indifferent to it either. This stance manifests in the current policies of the FHFA
in preventing the GSEs from offering refinancing options more widely. See supra note 9, Part
III. See also infra, Part IV.
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interests of maximizing loan or home EV (II.A.1., II.A.2.),
expeditious foreclosure (II.A.3.), minimizing transaction costs
(II.A.4.), maintaining health in the financial markets with low-tomoderate interest rates (II.A.5.), and maintaining as many
homeowners in their homes (II.A.7.).
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO SATISFACTION OF CONVERGENT
INVESTOR, BORROWER, AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INTERESTS 23
A broad array of mutually interlocking impediments stand in the
way of satisfying interests II.A.1. through II.A.5. I now turn to
cataloguing them in an intuitively tractable order.
A. IMPEDIMENTS TO MAXIMIZATION OF MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE
RECEIVED
The principal impediment to maximizing mortgage loan value
received (II.A.1.) appears to be the continuing slump in the real
estate and broader markets, 24 rendering it more difficult for
Borrowers to stay current on payments, and/or “economically
irrational,” in the view of some economists, for them to do so. That is
the case when home values push houses further “under water.”
When this happens, some borrowers “walk away” (so-called
“strategic defaults”) from their mortgage. Seeing other borrowers
“walking away” makes walking away all the more thinkable, and less
shameful. 25 The “negative equity” problem is exacerbated by home
equity lost by Borrowers pursuant to “home equity line of credit”
(“HELOC”) transactions conducted during the bubble years. 26
Furthermore, homes that are abandoned pursuant to “strategic
defaults” tend to deteriorate rapidly, resulting in more value lost to
lenders and to the nation’s stock of wealth.
23. No discussion of impediments to Servicer and State Functionary interests inasmuch as
these interests do not converge with Federal Government interests.
24. As I will more fully explain, that causality here is bidirectional. More on the
“feedback” structure of slump’s relation to interest II.A.1. presently. See supra, Introduction.
25. Literature on the ethics and economic rationality of “strategic default” has sprouted
since 2007. For a well-rounded study of strategic default and negative home equity, see, e.g.,
Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers 08-3, 2008),
www.bos.frb.org/ economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0803.pdf.
26. See Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, at 25.
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Partly at the root of the continuing slump in the market are
factors that impede efficient mortgage loan modifications that can
maximize the EVs of troubled loans and thus advance loan EV
maximization (II.A.1. and II.A.2.). These latter factors underwrite a
negative symbiosis or “feedback” effect between mortgage market
slump and loan EV maximization. Continuing slump is also partly
rooted in factors that act as direct impediments to satisfying the
interest of expeditious mortgage foreclosure proceedings (II.A.3.).
Hence, impediments to satisfying interest II.A.3. also act as
impediments to satisfying loan EV maximization. Micro-details of all
of these mechanisms follow.

1.
Impediments to Efficient EV-Maximizing Mortgage Loan
Modification
There appears 27 to be a multitude of impediments to efficient
EV-maximizing mortgage loan modification, each warranting
separate consideration. I proceed from structural, contractual, and
other institutional impediments to more specifically legal
impediments. Note that, as I shall find occasion to point out at
various points as we proceed, empirical study will be needed if we
wish to determine precisely how significant the actual effects of these
impediments.
a. Inaccessible Information
Anecdotal reports suggest that one impediment to efficient EVmaximizing loan modification is rooted in the difficulties Borrowers
face in determining who bears ultimate authority to renegotiate their
loan terms. Possible solutions to this problem are discussed below,
which include endorsing the Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Act of
2011, which aims to ensure clarity about such matters, changing the
mortgage and note recording system, and seeking greater clarity in
states’ bodies of agency law.
b. Borrower Humiliation and Demoralization
Anecdotal reports suggest that defaulting Borrower humiliation
and demoralization complement the inaccessible information
problem discussed above. 28 Borrowers in insolvency are too ashamed

27. Because more empirical study is required to determine precisely how significant the
actual effects of these impediments, we are presently largely confined to identifying tendencies
rather than measuring effects.
28. See, e.g., Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the
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or deflated to engage in “proactively” seeking out opportunities to
modify their loans, and might even fear answering telephone calls
from what would turn out to be loan-modifying agents after months
of dunning and badgering from collection agents. Any solution to the
information problem may best be complemented by “outreach”
programs aimed at inducing distressed Borrowers to respond to or
even “proactively” pursue loan-modification opportunities.
c. Pooling and Servicing Agreement Restrictions
The terms of many of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements
(“PSAs”) pursuant to which private-label residential real estate loans
are securitized appear to prevent (e.g., via unanimity or supermajority
voting requirements) loan Servicers from seeking proposed mortgage
loan modifications. Further empirical data would be helpful to
determine whether restructuring restrictions are prevalent and to
what extent such provisions block efforts toward making EVmaximizing mortgage modifications. 29 If the abundant anecdotal and
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 624 (2009).

29. There is substantial evidence that modification rates for distressed portfolio loans are
substantially higher than those for securitized loans, and this may suggest that PSAs present real
frictions to modification. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MORTGAGE METRIC REPORT FOR THIRD QUARTER 2008 (2009);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
MORTGAGE METRIC REPORT FOR FOURTH QUARTER 2008 (2009); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT FOR FIRST QUARTER 2009 (2009). These and additional reports are available at
www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/index-mortgage
- metrics.html.
To what extent the differences between portfolio loan and securitized loan modification
rates are traceable to contract provisions, compensation-based Servicer incentives, or
coordination problems among creditors remains less than fully determined. For possible
explanatory mechanisms and further corroboration of the correlation between securitization
and nonmodification, see Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Securitization and
Distressed Loan Negotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Chicago Booth
School of Business Research Paper, No. 09-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1321646.
A contrary view is found in Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why

Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization

(Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers No. 09-4, 2009), available at
www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf, which (1) purports to cast doubt on the
mentioned correlation, and (2) attributes nonmodification primarily to self-cure and redefault
risk. See also Christopher L. Foote et al., Reducing Foreclosures (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Boston, Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers No. 09-2, 2009), available at www.bos.frb.org/
economic/ppdp/ 2009/ppdp0902.pdf, which purports to find inadequate gains to Investors from
loan modifications a better explanation than contract (PSA) rigidities in accounting for low
securitized loan modification rates.
On the frequency with which modification restrictions appear within PSAs, there is thus
far preliminary and fragmentary data. See, e.g., John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime

Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan Modification? Preliminary Results and
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preliminary statistical evidence proves representative, however, these
restrictions are indeed prevalent. 30 Legal factors addressed below
appear to play a critically important part in prompting PSA terms of
this sort; the latter are accordingly not apt to be satisfactorily
addressable absent complementary changes to the former. 31
d. Servicer Compensation and Incentives
The PSAs typically lay out the arrangements pursuant to which
securitized loan Servicers are compensated. 32 At least where it is
residential rather than commercial real estate loans that are
securitized, these compensation arrangements do not appear fully to
align the incentives of generic Servicers—who combine payment
processing and (rather minimal) loss mitigation functions—on the one
hand, with the incentives of Investors and Borrowers, on the other
hand, when a mortgage loan becomes troubled.
In the context of residential mortgage Borrower insolvency,
Servicer compensation is largely independent of loan performance;
compensation is based on a number of fee-types assessable apart from
Borrower principal and interest payments. The upshot is that
Servicers can actually fare better financially over a twelve-to-eighteen
month course of drawn-out Borrower default than over a comparable
period of debt renegotiation, restructuring, and workout. 33
Meanwhile, (1) the comparatively low stakes, relative to
commercial real estate mortgage loans, attached to individual
residential real estate mortgage loans in securitized mortgage pools,
(2) wide dispersion among securitized residential mortgage Investors,
and (3) weak bargaining power on the part of Borrowers, all work
together to impede spontaneous development of more incentiveImplications (Berkley Center for Law, Working paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369286. See also Credit Suisse, The Day After Tomorrow:
Payment Shocks and Loan Modifications (2007).
30. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28.

31. A thorough overview of much of the terrain here circa 2009 is Anna Gelpern & Adam
J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential MortgageBacked Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2009). See also Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra
note 2.
32. Detailed description of these arrangements, as well as of their incentive effects and
much more on the servicing industry, can be found in Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of

Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions
of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs (Fed. Reserve Board, Wash. D.C., No. 2008-46,
2008), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/revision/200846pap.pdf. See also Alpert,
Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011).
33. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 27. See also Sarah Bloom Raskin, Putting the Low
Road Behind Us, Remarks at the Midwinter Housing Finance Conference (Feb. 11, 2011),
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20110211a.pdf.
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aligning compensation arrangements in the securitized residential real
estate loan market. 34 More quantitative empirical cataloguing of
prevalent Servicer compensation arrangements, and what causal role
they are apt to be actually playing in impeding EV-maximizing loan
modifications, will accordingly be helpful. 35
e. Creditor Coordination Problems
The tranching structures of typical private label residential real
estate loan securitization arrangements often present serious
structural obstacles to modifying underlying loans. 36 The reason is
that different tranches stand to benefit or lose under different
circumstances, such that a given tranche (or more) might fare better
under non-modification even when all tranches collectively fare
better under modification. The most obvious cases are those of junior
and senior tranches: Absent changes to their pre-modification
contractual rights, junior tranches are first to take losses in the event
of modification, while the senior tranches are the last to suffer in the
absence of modification. Insofar as PSAs as discussed supra, and/or
the law (e.g., Trust Indenture Act, more on which infra) confer veto
authority on each tranche, then, these tranches will bear significant
hold-up power in preventing EV-maximizing modifications.
At the same time, senior tranches likewise suffer significantly
when there are substantial repossessions and liquidations of
mortgaged homes. Some in the investment banking industry observe
that lack of movement in the modification “space” might well owe to
the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” upshot. Servicers, per
this line of thought, just like portfolio loan holders, might simply be
succumbing to inertia for the benefit of their beneficiaries, who
remain in “holding patterns” while awaiting and hoping for secular
change in the market. If every private actor is thus “waiting,”
however, no change is apt to come until some collective actor—a
government instrumentality—breaks the ice.
Empirical data on these arrangements is needed to ascertain the
prevalence and use of such power, and/or the degree to which its very

34. In the securitized commercial real estate mortgage market, by contrast, the sizes of
individual loans in the pools appear to have rendered Investors and Borrowers more active in
negotiating more incentive-aligning Servicer compensation arrangements. Here securitized
commercial loan Servicers divide into two specialties—transaction processors and loss
mitigators, with delinquent loan payments triggering shifts in responsibility from the former to
the latter. The latter, in turn, are paid in proportion to restructured loan performance, rather
than in the form of fees that are independent of such performance.
35. For important preliminary work along these lines, see sources cited supra notes 27–31.
36. See generally sources cited supra notes 27–31.
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The likelihood is already

f. Bankruptcy Law
Insofar as PSAs and other factors (e.g., the Trust Indenture Act,
considered below) impose supermajority creditor voting requirements
on would-be loan modifications, they confer hold-up power upon
recalcitrant creditors. Where this combines with securitized pooling
arrangements that can produce conflicting interests among distinct
tranches or classes of creditor in the context of insolvency, it gives rise
to insurmountable coordination obstacles to loan modification, as
noted above.
In many contexts, bankruptcy law operates specifically to
overcome such obstacles. Equity trumps law to permit and encourage
value-maximizing loan restructuring. Regrettably, while 11 U.S.C. §§
1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) authorize Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
debtors, respectively, to seek modification of creditor claims secured
by property that does not constitute those debtors’ primary
residences, no such provisions authorize debtors to seek modification
of creditor claims that are secured by debtors’ primary residences. 37
Indeed, the latter provision prohibits it. An additional problem here
is the fact that some states possess “homestead” exemptions of
portions of home values from loss in bankruptcy (see Part IV.C.1.e.),
which interact in sometimes unpredictable ways with these provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.
A simple change to the federal Bankruptcy Code could afford an
immediate federal solution to the problem of modificationunavailability, effectively sidestepping any need there may otherwise
be to address multiple PSAs, Servicer contracts, or relevant state laws
(more below). Recent Congressional attempts to take this step—in
the form of S. 61, the Helping Families Save Their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act of 2009, and H.R. 225, the Emergency
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 2009—have failed to
reach the floors for vote.

37. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30. For a proposed “lease swap” solution to the
problem, see Robert Hockett, How about Lease Swaps as a Mortgage Market Cure?,
BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011), www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1987688/how-about-home-leaseswapping-as-a-mortgage-market-cure#. See also Robert Hockett, Lease Swaps as Mortgage
Market Cure, DORF ON LAW (Oct. 16, 2011), www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/10/post-by-bob-hockettlease-swaps-as.html.

HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

392

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

3/31/2013 11:29 PM

Vol. 9:3

g. “Bankruptcy-Remote” Organizational Forms
Complementing the Bankruptcy Code’s operation is the fact that
most entities through which mortgage loans are securitized are
structured to prevent their filing for bankruptcy. One way that this is
affected is by organizing the entities as trusts, which, per 11 U.S.C. §
109(a), do not count as “persons” eligible to file under the
Bankruptcy Code. 38
A complementary strategy is contractually, e.g., via the PSAs, to
prohibit the securitization vehicle from voluntarily filing for
bankruptcy, and likewise to prohibit, through covenants, the parties
from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against the trust. 39 The
trust will also be prohibited by contract from engaging in various
transactions with third parties, of kinds that might enable the third
party to file involuntary petitions against the trust. The aim is to keep
the securitization arrangement “bankruptcy-remote,” one of its
attractions to creditors.
In this connection, the “skin in the game” requirements imposed
under the Dodd-Frank Act could yield a welcome side-benefit where
bankruptcy-remoteness is concerned: Current securitization vehicles
are kept clear of the possible financial difficulties of loan originators
by so-called “true sales,” pursuant to which originators sell the
entireties of the mortgage loans they sell in order that the latter not
be counted as assets in originators’ bankrupt estates. Retention
requirements will of course render that no longer possible.
h. Trust Indenture Law
Though the question does not appear to have been litigated, the
terms of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbb
(“TIA”)—which applies to all bonds instruments, including RMBS—
would seem to require unanimous consent among bondholders before
rights to receive principal and interest payments on the securities can
be altered. 40 That would impede modifying the terms of underlying
mortgage loans, assuming modifications would alter payments into
the legal entity on whose behalf the Servicer collects on underlying
mortgages before distributing proceeds to RMBS-holders. This would
be so even were modifications to underlying loans demonstrably to
P40F

P

38. There is an exception for “business trusts,” but the Code does not define the term and
different courts come out differently on what counts as a business trust for Bankruptcy Code
purposes. To guard against the possibility that courts may find them to be business trusts,
securitization vehicles typically employ additional, complementary strategies to ensure
bankruptcy-remoteness. For thorough treatment, see Levitin, supra note 27.
39. Or, rather than prohibiting the parties from thus filing, the vehicle’s PSA might require
supermajority voting in favor of such filing.
40. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 27.
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improve expected EVs. For the TIA’s requirements are categorical,
while actually securing the categorically required express unanimity
among thousands or millions of RMBS holders worldwide so highly
improbable as to amount to impossibility.
While it is not clear to what extent, if any, the TIA currently
figures into the thinking of Servicers and trust administrators
considering mortgage modifications, given the many more
conspicuous factors already cited that serve to dissuade modification,
it surely would present an obstacle were the other obstacles to be
removed. It must accordingly be considered when we turn below to
policy options.

i. Internal Revenue Code (Prior to 2009)
Sections 860A through 860G of the Internal Revenue Code
(“Code”), as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
under its Revenue Procedures and Treasury Regulations, at least
until September 2009, conditioned the pass-through tax treatment of
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICs”), which hold
securitized mortgages, upon strict passivity.
Modifications of
underlying mortgage loans for their part were treated until recently as
departures from the required passivity. Hence, securitized mortgage
obligations up to that point could be modified only on pain of
significant back-tax penalty.
Changes made by the IRS to the text of its Revenue Procedures 41
and Treasury Regulations 42 in mid-September of 2009, however,
which apply retroactively to early 2008, have arguably removed this
erstwhile impediment to loan modification. It might nevertheless be
advisable to attempt to corroborate empirically that these changes are
having their intended effect. I can attest on the basis of conversations
with some acquaintances at upscale Wall Street law firms and
investment banks, for example, that at least some professionals are
scratching their heads over how best to synthesize the newly
introduced language with other language that remains in the
operative provisions. Investment bankers of my acquaintance
maintain vigorously that there must be a complete and unambiguous
safe harbor where modification is concerned, applying to all REMICs
to date. The alternative, they argue, is continuing passivity, which is
anathema to the maximization of recovery.

41. See Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2 (2009).
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j. Accounting Standards
Tax considerations are not the sole considerations that have
given REMICS reason to eschew loan modification so as to assure
passivity. The wish to preserve off-balance-sheet status appears to
continue to operate similarly. 43 For a loan originator, who typically
continues on as a Servicer, to realize a gain on the sale of the loan and
remove the loan form its balance sheet as it aims to do, the trust to
which it sells the loan must be “qualified” under the accounting
standards as promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (“FASB”) and employed by the SEC in its regulatory roles.
That in turn requires that the originator retain no “control” over the
assets. 44
Although (a) the standards do not elaborate on what counts as
“control,” and (b) some SEC staff have opined that modifications of
imminently defaulting loans probably would not count as “control” of
the sort that will shift assets back to originator/Servicer balance
sheets, 45 there is sufficient uncertainty on the matter as to render the
avoidance of modification prudent in the eyes of cautious
originator/Servicers. If and insofar as continuing to allow securitizing
entities to maintain off-balance-sheet status is thought desirable, then
(a perhaps dubious proposition in light of recent financial history), it
might be well advised to alter regulatory regimes that render that
status contingent upon forms of passivity that preclude EV-enhancing
modification of underlying mortgage loans. This point reinforces that
made just above in Section IV.A.1.i.
It might be that a
comprehensive safe harbor, where modification is concerned, should
be made unambiguously available.

2. Impediments to Satisfying the Interest of Expeditious Mortgage
Foreclosure (II.A.3.), In Turn Impedes the Maximization of Loan
Value Received (II.A.1.)
Part IV.C., infra, hereby incorporated into this subpart by

reference, will provide a complete catalogue of impediments to fair,
efficient, and reliable mortgage foreclosure. It does so because, per
Part II.A.3., supra, this is an interest in its own right. I incorporate it
here by reference, however, because impediments to its satisfaction

43. See FASB, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities, in Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, ¶¶ 8–13
(2008).
44. FASB, supra note 42, ¶¶ 8–13.
45. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, to Rep. Barney Frank,
Chairman of Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. House of Representatives (July 24, 2007).
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also impede satisfaction of interest II.A.1., for reasons suggested
above. In order better to picture the many interactions mentioned in
the Introduction and further discussed herein, please see the
flowchart in the Appendix.
B. IMPEDIMENTS TO MAXIMIZATION OF LOAN VALUE REMITTED
(II.A.2.)
The principal impediments to maximizing mortgage loan value

remitted (II.A.2.) are the same as those discussed above in

connection with maximization of loan value received, Part IV.A.
These are continuing slump in the real estate and broader markets
and the factors that contribute to that slump, including impediments
to (1) efficient loan restructuring that could better maximize the EVs
of troubled loans, and (2) expeditious foreclosure procedures. Steps
taken to address these impediments will inure to the benefit of
Borrower and Investor interests, as discussed above in Part III.
C. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EXPEDITION OF FAIR, EFFICIENT, AND
RELIABLE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS (II.A.3.)

There are multiple impediments to the satisfaction of interest
II.A.3.—expedition of fair, efficient, and reliable foreclosure. Many
of these are rooted in complexities, along with attendant uncertainties
or indeterminacies, as well as inter- or intra-state 46 inconsistencies, in
real property law, commercial law, and related agency law regimes.
Over the long term, these difficulties would likely keep mortgage
borrowing costs higher than they need be.
Hence there will be reason to change them. On the other hand,
in view of their rootedness in state laws concerning areas of
traditional state jurisdiction, they are not apt to change quickly. The
good news, however, is that, as we shall see, state law also affords
very promising means of executing the most promising means of
addressing the more immediate crisis—namely, via municipalities’
assembling controlling blocs of mortgage notes through exercise of
their eminent domain power. But for purposes of this Subsection we
confine ourselves to the foreclosure piece of the story.

46. There are pronounced inter-state inconsistencies as well, but it is less clear that these
cause uncertainty so much as they increase transaction costs.
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1. Divergent and Complex Property Law Regimes
Real property laws governing proper mortgage foreclosure and,
in some cases, deficiency judgment procedures, vary significantly
among and within states. Such differences result in increased
transaction costs (II.A.4.).
Such differences also presumably
introduce uncertainty among RMBS holders as to which securities are
best secured, and which are least well secured, by their underlying
mortgages. That is particularly so where the mentioned divergences
are intra- rather than interstate. Empirical study is needed to show
the precise extent, if any, to which this form of uncertainty may
depress RMBS values. 47 For now, details of the complexities and
legal divergences themselves follow.
a. “Judicial” Foreclosure Regimes
About 20 states permit “judicial” foreclosure alone, which
typically involves time-consuming procedural steps and is often
appealable. 48 In these states, foreclosure can take years to complete.49
While these procedural steps may be necessary to protect Borrowers
and keep them in their homes, 50 significant variations across and even
within these states—for example, differences in judicially imposed
notice periods and evidentiary requirements 51—produce uncertainties
and result in higher transaction costs, as detailed in Part IV.D.

47. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text, for such work as seems thus far to have
been done along these lines.
48. Typical judicial foreclosure includes nine basic steps: (1) filing of foreclosure complaint
and lis pendens notice; (2) service of process on all potentially interested parties, including
creditors of Mortgagor/Borrower; (3) hearing before judge or chancery master who reports to
court; (4) entry of judgment or decree; (5) public notice of sale; (6) public foreclosure sale itself,
conducted by sheriff or functional equivalent; (7) post-sale adjudication of disposition of
foreclosure sale proceeds; (8) in states that permit, entry of deficiency judgment, should
proceeds fall short of the debt; (9) in some cases, appeal of judgment. Time taken can be
multiple years. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L. J. 1399 (2004); Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing
on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve,
Working Paper No. 2003-16, 2003), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200316/200316
pap.pdf.
49. See sources cited supra note 47.
50. Where EV-maximizing mortgage loan modification is effectively unavailable for the
reasons laid out supra, Part IV.A, this Borrower interest seems all the more compelling. Were
modification more widely available, impediments to efficient foreclosure might be more readily
deplored.
51. See Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes,
Nov. 14, 2011, at 13.
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b. “Power of Sale” Regimes
About 30 states permit “power of sale,” or “nonjudicial,”
foreclosure instead of or in addition to judicial foreclosure. Even
though the processes for power of sale (“POS”) foreclosure generally
operate substantially more expeditiously than POS’s judicial
counterpart, 52 often requiring less than one year, 53 significant
variations occur across and within states where notice and evidentiary
requirements are concerned in both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure contexts. 54
There is also much variation in the degrees, if any, to which
purchasers in such sales may rely upon presumptions of sale validity
given trustee representations of compliance with their states’ nonjudicial foreclosure statutes. 55 Insofar as these variations are present
within states, they introduce uncertainties that would seem apt
adversely to affect the values of mortgage loans and associated
securities. Even when these variations are present across rather than
within states, they occasion transaction costs of the Part II.A.4.
variety, as discussed infra, Part IV.D.
c. “Statutory Redemption” Regimes
About 22 states—principally but not solely those that require
judicial foreclosure—afford “statutory redemption” rights upon
mortgagors and, in some cases, lienholders as well. These rights
holders are afforded one year or longer to purchase or repurchase
title to the property after the foreclosure sale by paying the
foreclosure purchaser the sale price plus accrued interest and other
expenses. This slows foreclosure yet further and represents a
significant transaction cost—though, like slow foreclosure processes
where loan modification is effectively unavailable, it offers benefits as
well. 56 Among states that provide for statutory redemption, there is
significant variation concerning time periods and terms, and this too
represents a significant transaction cost. 57

52. The steps involved typically are (1) filing of public notice of sale by mortgagee/lender or
a third party (typically a sheriff or trustee), and (2) publicly selling. Time taken typically ranges
from six to eight months. See generally Nelson & Whitman, supra note 47.
53. Id.
54. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 4.
55. See id. at 18. On the matter of benefits, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56. The rationales behind statutory redemption are (1) to afford more opportunity to
mortgagor/debtors to retain their properties, and (2) to encourage fair pricing of foreclosed
properties, since low bids are more apt to be successfully redeemed than are high ones.
57. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 5.
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d. “Deficiency Judgment” Regimes
About 25 states permit post-foreclosure “deficiency judgments”
against mortgagor/debtors, wherein mortgagee/creditors sue
mortgagors for the difference, if such there be, between foreclosure
sale price and outstanding mortgage debt. There is further variation
among these states in respect of limitations on deficiency judgments.58
These laws concerning deficiency judgments affect the degree to
which creditors can recover in full on the values of their investments
in the event of default by Borrowers. Variation in them across states
of course presents transaction costs of the Part II.A.4. variety, as
discussed below in Part IV.D.
e. “Homestead” Regimes
Ten or so states have so-called “homestead” laws, which exempt
primary residences or portions of the value thereof from creditors in
the event of personal bankruptcy on the part of a homeowner.
Homestead laws introduce an additional element of uncertainty into
the foreclosure process.
f. Undetermined Causal Consequences
It will be helpful, in the interest of determining to what degree if
any the Federal Government ought to concern itself with these
regimes and divergences, to conduct or commission hard empirical
work that tests for effects they might wreak upon residential real
estate, mortgage loan, and RMBS prices. Ideally that work would
attend not only to the effects wrought by specific state regimes, but
also to those, if any, wrought specifically by non-uniformity itself
across and within states. 59 A robust correlation between pricesuppression and non-uniformity would presumably recommend
greater efforts at harmonization—perhaps up to federalization itself.

58. Some states impose “one action,” or “security first” rules that require that
mortgagee/creditors foreclose first and sue for deficiency after, while others permit
mortgagee/creditors to seek satisfaction from mortgagor/debtors’ other assets before
foreclosure on mortgaged property. Some states likewise have “fair value” laws which limit
permitted deficiency judgments to the difference between mortgage debt and the fair value of
the foreclosed property rather than that between mortgage debt and the realized foreclosure
sale price.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.2 (1997) asserts that “legal
differences from state to state can seriously impede the carrying out of [] business arrangements
. . . .” But even assuming that this is true, it is a matter distinct from what effect such
nonuniformity has on secondary markets once securitization is an accomplished fact. At least
one scholar has argued that nonuniformity as such does not generate significant costs. See
Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 286–87 (1999).
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It should be emphasized, however, that non-uniformity as such,
at least insofar as it occurs across rather than within states, does not
thus far appear to have been shown to generate significant pricesuppressive effects. Non-uniformity within states presumably could
be shown to do so insofar as it amounts to unpredictability. All forms
of non-uniformity, in turn, will occasion higher transaction costs, and
it might accordingly be useful to quantify these with a view to
informing discussion concerning the costs and benefits of interstate
non-uniformity.
We should bear in mind, however, that these are probably best
viewed as questions for the longer term, given how difficult it would
be to address these matters of traditional state concern at one fell
federal swoop. Although they do presumably bear upon the markets’
present valuation of RMBS, in view of the uncertainty they impart to
attachable collateral value, the very promising “control bloc
assembly” solutions I shall propose below will very likely moot them
for present purposes.

2. Divergent and Confusing Commercial Law Regimes
There is considerable uncertainty within and across states
concerning who may enforce mortgage-secured promissory notes
against whom, and accordingly gain title to the mortgage deeds, hence
the collateral, securing those notes.
There is also confusion
concerning whether mortgage deeds might be severed from the notes
they secure in the event that note assignments are not accompanied
by change-of-lienholder recordings in local property registries. Both
sets of confusions appear to have played some role in prompting the
fabrication of false ex post paper trails of the sort that have figured
into recent “robo-signing” scandals. Both also occasion transaction
costs as discussed infra, Part IV.D. Principal sources of uncertainty
here are as follows.
a. Uniform Commercial Code Article 3
When a residential mortgage-related promissory note qualifies as
a negotiable instrument, Article 3 specifies who is entitled to enforce
the note against whom. But there appears to be widespread
disagreement and confusion both across and even within states, not to
mention among scholars, as to whether many—or even any—
residential mortgage-related promissory notes meet the criteria of
negotiability. When courts do treat such notes as negotiable, they
appear often simply to assume negotiability or to find it on the basis
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of quite cursory analysis. 60 The reason is twofold: On the one hand,
the language of Section 3-104(a), which elaborates the criteria of
negotiability, appears to suggest that some provisos commonly
attending modern securitizable mortgage notes might disqualify the
notes as negotiable instruments; on the other hand, the language only
suggests this rather than actually determining it, so that courts and
others are left hanging. 61
The long term stakes involved in Article 3’s applicability or
otherwise are high. For one thing, if a mortgage note is indeed
negotiable, then the right to enforce that note can be transferred,
under Article 3, only by physical delivery of the original note. 62
Hence, homeowners who have succeeded in defending against
foreclosure have done so because the foreclosing parties could not
deliver or show possession of the note upon the homeowners’
requests. And hence, in consequence, the temptation among some
would-be foreclosers to fabricate false ex post paper trails of the sort
exposed in the recent “robo-signing” scandals. For another thing, if
the note is negotiable, then the “holder in due course” doctrine is
implicated and can preclude a distressed or defaulting Borrower’s
from raising an otherwise valid defense of fraud in the origination of

60. See, e.g., Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage
Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 755–56 (2010) (finding that, of the

forty-two reported cases from 1990 to 2010 in which courts made determinations concerning (a)
mortgage note negotiability or (b) “holder in due course” status which presupposes
negotiability, only two featured full analysis of negotiability of the note, while thirty-three
simply assumed negotiability without argument).
61. For example, U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) requires that the note “not state any other
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to [perform] any act in
addition to the payment,” and there is much unresolved argument concerning whether some of
such features of modern mortgage notes as the “written notification of prepayment”
requirement found in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac residential mortgage form amounts to
one of those disqualifying “other undertaking[s] or instruction[s].”
Dale A. Whitman & Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and
Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 984–95 (1997) take opposite views on this particular
example, while both agree that there is no obvious answer and conclude that negotiability is
accordingly best deemed obsolete and ought be abandoned. See, e.g., id. at 755.
62. This is the upshot of U.C.C. §§ 3-301 and 3-203(a) read in tandem. It remains true
notwithstanding the “lost note” provisions of U.C.C. § 3-309, at least prior to 2002, in that the
terms of that section imply that the would-be note-enforcer must have been in possession of the
note at the time that it was lost. The PEB’s 2002 amendment to § 3-309 rectifies that problem,
but only ten states have adopted it, and the language of the Section suggests that it is expected
to be applied in “courts,” hence perhaps not in non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
Those forty states that have not adopted the 2002 amendment to § 3-309 divide over
whether other UCC provisions, such as § 1-103(b)’s incorporation, inter alia, of all compatible
general assignment principles of law and equity, or § 3-203’s apparent vesting of all instrumenttransferors’ enforcement rights in transferees, might offer any assistance in “lost note” cases.
Here is another source of uncertainty. Even where allowances are made for lost notes,
compliance with attendant conditions by would-be enforcers entails substantial burdens.
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the underlying loan. Again, then, much can ride on the surprisingly
underdetermined question of mortgage note negotiability.
Another source of confusion concerning the upshot of Article 3
is that the concept of “person entitled to enforce” a mortgage-related
note (also called a “holder”) and that of an “owner” of a mortgagerelated note are distinct even if overlapping concepts implicated by
the Article, and there appears to be a widespread (not to say
understandable) tendency to conflate them in light of the terms’
rough synonymy per ordinary English usage.
This can in turn lead to confusion, even in courts, over who has
standing to foreclose on a mortgage. 63 This potential confusion can
be further compounded by the fact that yet another term relevant to
Article 3—that of a note’s “bearer,” or person “in possession” of the
note—is itself distinct from “holder” and “owner” alike,
notwithstanding, again, all three terms’ rough synonymy in ordinary
English usage. Muddying these waters yet further was the practice of
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) in allowing its
noteholder members to institute foreclosures in its name rather than
in their own names, labeling MERS a “mortgagee of record.” 64 These
confusions present transaction costs and give rise to uncertainties that
can adversely affect the present values of RMBS and residential real
estate, since success in foreclosure seems to vary randomly across
courts rather than systematically across states or not at all. Thorough
empirical study and quantification of these effects, if possible, would
be helpful—though again, the likelihoods seem clear already. It is
also worth once again emphasizing, however, that the promise offered
by “control bloc assembly” solutions to the present crisis that I shall
emphasize below should enable us to take our time about addressing
this matter as something for the longer term. It might also bear
noting here, both in anticipation of the discussion of policy options
below and in light of the longer term rather than shorter term
significance of the subject, that the concept of negotiability itself is
perhaps best regarded as simply out of place in modern mortgage
markets. For the point of negotiability historically was to render
instruments—principally
bank-issued
or
bank-discounted
instruments—liquid by assuring prospective bearers of cashsubstitutability. That is something that simply cannot be expected of
mortgage notes—issued to banks rather than by banks—whose value
inevitably rides upon the ever-variable quality of heterogeneous
underlying loans, collateral, and foreclosure law. Again, though,

63. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 5.
64. Id.
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there will be more to say about all of these matters below as the
Article turns to proposed solutions to our present problems.
b. Uniform Commercial Code Article 9
Irrespective of whether a mortgage related promissory note
qualifies as a negotiable instrument under Article 3, Article 9 will
bear implications for any transaction involving that note. It will do so
by dint of either or both of two possible characteristics of the
transaction with which the note is associated: (1) by dint of the note’s
being issued pursuant to a transaction in which property serves as
collateral for one party’s (the Borrower’s) obligation; and/or (2) if the
note comes to be sold (e.g., to a securitizer) then also by dint of that
sale’s being the sale of a payment right.
Potential confusion apparently attends this “two track” means of
falling under Article 9, at least where mortgage-related notes are
concerned. For Article 9 employs the same term-of-art, “security
interest,” in connection with both, thereby inviting conflation.
Specifically, Article 9 employs the term “security interest” to
designate both (1) the note-holder’s interest in the collateral securing
the note—viz., the mortgaged property—and (2) the note-holder’s
right to regular payment under the note.
The fact that the same term is employed to designate both a
primary right (that to payment) and a secondary recourse triggered
by default on the primary obligation (that to collateral) can foster
confusion concerning whether payment rights under transferred notes
can become severed from rights to collateral under mortgages. Such
confusion can result in note-holders’ erroneously being thought to
lack rights to foreclose on property absent physical possession of
mortgage deeds. That may in turn afford another incentive for
fabricating false ex post paper trails of the kind exposed in the “robosigning” scandals. 65 It also occasions possibly price-suppressive
uncertainties and, transaction costs.
The fact that both sets of Article-9-cognizable rights go by one
name (“security interest”) might encourage misperception that they
are “on the same level,” hence divisible and separately conveyable,
notwithstanding UCC § 9-203(g)’s provision to the contrary codifying

65. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC
386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (casting doubt on the
“mortgage follows the note” rule). Compare, e.g., In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL
2684265, at *2–4 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 7, 2007) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the
former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage
with it.”).
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the longstanding common law principle that “the mortgage follows
the note.” 66
c. Divergent Agency Law Regimes
There appears to be considerable variation across and within
states concerning who may act as an agent on behalf of a mortgage
loan holder in seeking (1) enforcement of a mortgage related
promissory note and (2) foreclosure on the mortgage that secures it.
These differences have especially plagued efforts by MERS to pursue
foreclosures on behalf of mortgage loan holders who are members of
the organization.
The troubles are partly of MERS’s own making, insofar as it
employed misleading terminology in describing its status in various
proceedings, as noted above. But the fact remains that nonuniform
agency law standards represents a potentially significant source of
uncertainty where foreclosure, hence the ultimate value of collateral
and of the loans and RMBS that the collateral effectively secures, are
concerned. That uncertainty, and its effect on the mortgage markets
and mortgage holding institutions that are members of MERS, are on
vivid display now.
Non-uniformity also occasions transaction costs and presumably
accounts at least partly for MERS’s recent legal difficulties
themselves.
D. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
CAUSED BY MORTGAGE FINANCE, REFINANCE, AND FORECLOSURE
ARRANGEMENTS
Many of the factors discussed above in connection with loan
value maximization (IV.A.) and expeditious foreclosure (IV.C.) also
present significant transaction costs of the sort that Investors,
Borrowers, and presumably the Federal Government would prefer to
minimize.
Particularly important are the impediments below.
Insofar as they impede value-maximizing loan modifications the
parties wish to make, they too represent significant loan-valuereducing costs:

66. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 63. The mentioned UCC provision reads: “The
attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security
interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the
security interest, mortgage, or other lien.”
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• Informational Barriers to Loan Renegotiation, per Part
III.A.1.a.
• Borrower
Demoralization
Impediments
to
Loan
Renegotiation, per Part IV.A.1.b.
• PSA Restrictions on Loan Modification, per Part IV.A.1.c.
• PSA-determined Servicer Compensation Arrangements, per
Part IV.A.1.d.
• Creditor Coordination Problems, per Part IV.A.1.e.
• Current Bankruptcy Law, per Part IV.A.1.f.
• “Bankruptcy-Remoteness” Arrangements, per Part IV.A.1.g.
• Trust Indenture Law, per Part IV.A.1.h.
• Internal Revenue Code (until 2009), per Part IV.A.1.i.
• Accounting Standards, per Part IV.A.1.j.
• Complex and Divergent Property Law Regimes, per Part
IV.C.1.
• Complex and Divergent Commercial Law Regimes, per Part
IV.C.2.
• Divergent Agency Law Regimes, per Part IV.C.3.
Note that three of the impediments—Complex and Divergent
Property Law Regimes; Complex and Divergent Commercial Law
Regimes; and Divergent Agency Law Regimes—represent significant
loan-value-reducing costs regardless of whether the divergences are
inter- or intra-state. The latter, by introducing unpredictability and
uncertainty to the pricing of real estate and RMBS, presumably are
more deleterious than the former. But both forms of divergence give
rise to a need on the part of Investors to research greater numbers of
legal regimes in valuing real estate and RMBS, and accordingly raise
transaction costs.
E. IMPEDIMENTS TO MAINTENANCE OF THE HEALTH OF THE U.S.
AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (II.A.5.)
The principal impediments to satisfaction of interest II.A.5.—just
characterized—are the same as those noted above in connection with
maximization of loan value received (Part IV.A.), maximization of
loan value remitted (Part IV.B.), expeditious foreclosure proceedings
(Part IV.C.), and minimization of transaction costs (Part IV.D.). Any
steps taken to address these impediments will advance relevant
Federal Government interests as surely as they will Investor and
Borrower interests.
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F. CHALLENGES TO MAINTENANCE OF AS MUCH TRADITIONAL
STATE JURISDICTION OVER AGENCY, COMMERCIAL, AND REAL
PROPERTY LAW MATTERS IN THE U.S. AS IS PRACTICABLE (II.A.6.)
As this Article takes the point of view of the Federal
Government, hence of Borrowers and Investors as well, I do not
attempt here to catalogue all threats to this particular interest
associated primarily with State Functionaries. Instead I shall simply
keep this interest in mind when turning below to various possible
means of addressing the impediments to Borrower, Investor, and
Federal Government interests catalogued in the preceding Subparts.
We now turn to those options.
V. MEANS OF REMOVING OR DIMINISHING IMPEDIMENTS TO
SATISFACTION OF CONVERGENT INVESTOR, BORROWER, AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS
Each impediment discussed above can be addressed by any
number of means. The focus here will be on means that (a) look
realistically attainable and worthy of Federal Government support,
(b) are conspicuously on offer at present from one quarter or another,
or (c) both.
A. MAXIMIZING MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE RECEIVED
As the principal impediment to satisfaction of this interest seems
to be continuing slump in the real estate and broader markets, one of
the more direct means of satisfying this interest would seem to be to
end the mentioned slump. 67 The Federal Reserve has long been hard
at work on this score, via both its monetary and quantitative easing
actions in general and its own MBS-purchases in particular.
Additional efforts, however, are needed to address the specific
impediments to loan modification that continue to impede EV-

67. See in particular “Pillar 1” of Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, for more on
how best to design stimulus packages that address slump from the equity side of the debt/equity
imbalance that is our current debt overhang problem. See also Robert Hockett, White Paper in
Support of the Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012 (Cornell Legal Studies Research
Paper, Working Paper No. 12-10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2029239; Robert Hockett & Robert Frank, Public Infrastructure Investment,
Renewed Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, Working
Paper No. 2-04, 2012), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987656.

HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

406

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

3/31/2013 11:29 PM

Vol. 9:3

maximization, and the specific impediments to the expeditious
foreclosure proceedings. I will now address a number of possibilities
along these lines.

1. Facilitating Efficient EV-Maximizing Mortgage Loan Modification
a. More Accessible Information
One possible means of removing uncertainty concerning who is
authorized to negotiate modifications is to pass S. 967, the Regulation
of Mortgage Servicing Act of 2011, as noted above in Part III.A.1.a.,
or some counterpart bill, pending further study of the bill’s
ramifications. Another measure would be reform of the current
mortgage and note recording system, ideally in the form of a readily
accessible and editable electronic registry system—e.g., a fully
generalized MERS system. Were such a system to include constant
real time information concerning who is authorized to negotiate
modifications on behalf of noteholders, there might be no need of
further legislation on this particular score. The Federal Government,
moreover, could support implementation of some such system at less
political risk than would like attend support of a particular piece of
pending legislation. Finally, it should be noted that neither of these
measures will prove helpful absent additional measures targeting
additional impediments that currently complement the informational
impediment referenced here. More on those will be discussed below.
b. Borrower Counseling and Assistance
“Proactive” Borrower outreach and counseling programs could
assist the cause of EV-maximizing loan modification by reducing the
number of troubled Borrowers who are dissuaded from inquiring or
learning about loan modification opportunities due to feeling
humiliated and demoralized, particularly after dunning by collection
agents. The Federal Government could presumably lend its support
to such efforts at little to no political risk. Were the Federal
Government via the Fed, FHA, Fannie, Freddie, FDIC, or Treasury
to hold ownership of complete pools of mortgages as considered
below, it would be particularly well situated actually to engage in such
outreach itself.
c. Addressing Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) Restrictions ;
in Particular, by Assembling Controlling Blocks of RMBS
There appear to be three principal potential means of addressing
current PSA restrictions on modification of underlying securitized
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mortgage loans.
Each would represent collective means of
surmounting the current collective action problem that prevents
measures that stand to benefit all. One such measure would be the
highly unlikely measure of cajoling all (or, where applicable,
supermajorities of all) current holders of each vehicle’s bonds into
agreeing to modifications of currently underperforming underlying
mortgage loans. This prospect is an abstract possibility at best, and
therefore probably not worthy of further comment.
Another measure would be for one or more units of government
to exercise eminent domain power to “take” at fair value all bonds
necessary to acquiring the necessary contractual authority to approve
underlying loan modifications in keeping with existing PSAs. While
federal action along these lines might appear to have dubious
precedential or statutory basis, 68 local such action would likely fare
better. The reader can expect to see action along these lines in
future, more on which prospect further below.
A third option would involve government agencies’ purchasing,
perhaps via cooperative arrangements among, e.g., the Fed, FHA,
Fannie, Freddie, FDIC, even Treasury, RMBS on the secondary
market with a view to assembling such blocks as would enable
something like the second option noted above to be effected without
exercise of eminent domain power. One might even imagine publicprivate partnerships along these lines, wherein new, “second order”
securitization vehicles are formed specifically in order to assemble
controlling blocks of current RMBS. Such vehicles also could be
used, of course, in connection with the second option noted—the
eminent domain option—as a means of financing.
Finally, a somewhat more narrowly targeted variation on this
third option (“Three Prime”) would be to purchase only those
particular tranches of particular RMBS that object to modification,
per Part V.A.1.e, below.
It is difficult to ascertain the full extent to which measures like
Option Three or Three Prime are currently being exercised, though
such efforts definitely have been at least modestly underway. Since I
have been advocating that this be done on a grand scale since early
69
2008, I cannot but be intrigued by the prospect of seeing more of it
done. I still think that it might ultimately be the single most gooddoing measure that the Federal Government and its peer agencies
might take to establish, at long last, a “floor” beneath still sagging
residential real estate and RMBS markets. It would in one stroke

68. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept.
25, 2008), www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html.
69. See, e.g., Hockett II, supra note 2, at 48 for one more or less fully elaborated rendition.
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eliminate or sidestep all obstacles to EV-maximizing loan
modification recalled just above, as well as those to be recalled below.
The beneficial effects on the markets would likely be so
pronounced as to preempt any political “backlash” that might
otherwise be experienced in response to government “activism” in
this realm. But there is no denying that it would constitute a “big”
move, which might accordingly occasion at least some short term
political expense. This might ultimately render Option 2—the
eminent domain option—more workable. For this option would be
most likely to be undertaken by municipalities aiming to keep
families in their homes, hold communities together, maintain
property values and necessary revenue bases, and stave off the blight
and high crime rates that attend it. And action by municipalities and
states seems to be more acceptable to many who decry federal action.
d. Reforming Servicer Compensation Arrangements
As noted above, Part IV.A.1.d., Servicer compensation
arrangements currently standard in RMBS-associated PSAs fail to
align Servicer with Borrower and Investor incentives when underlying
mortgage loans enter the vicinity of insolvency. Arrangements in the
securitized commercial real estate (“CMBS”) market, by contrast, do.
At first blush, at least, it would seem that the Federal Government
could, at relatively low political risk, lend its name to calls made by
others for reform of the RMBS servicer market along lines
characteristic of the CMBS servicer market.
The Federal Government could also quietly encourage, then to
endorse, moves by Fannie and Freddie to employ or require such
arrangements in connection with mortgages or RMBS that they hold.
Note, however, that anything along these lines would presumably be a
matter of future, not present, residential real estate securitization
arrangements. It would not of itself do anything about our current
troubles—unless, say, “second order” securitization vehicles were
formed, after such reform, to act along lines suggested immediately
above, Part V.A.1.c.
e. Addressing Creditor Coordination Barriers to Loan Modification
As noted above, the tranching structures characteristic of typical
private label residential real estate mortgage loan securitization
arrangements present serious structural obstacles to modification of
underlying loans. One way to address these would be for the Federal
Government itself, via one or more public agencies and/or private
sector partners, to purchase controlling blocks of RMBS, per Option
Three considered supra, Part V.A.1.c.
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Another, more narrowly targeted approach, however, would be
to purchase those tranches of particular RMBS that bear incentives to
“hold-up” would be loan workouts, per Option Three Prime
mentioned above in Part V.A.1.c. Pursuit of this option by coalitions
of agencies or public/private partnerships might not be unrealistic,
and would not seem a great leap from what some agencies already are
doing. Finally, the Federal Government might also wish, in this
connection, to get behind efforts at bankruptcy law reform, as
described next.
f. Bankruptcy Reform
As noted above, bankruptcy law is designed specifically to
overcome creditor coordination problems of the sort just recalled.
The problem is that the Bankruptcy Code as presently found does not
permit Borrowers to force residential mortgage loan EV-maximizing
modifications by filing for bankruptcy, at least not where the
residences in question are their “primary” residences. While bills
have been introduced in both houses of Congress with a view to
addressing this impediment to loan modification, they have not yet
gone anywhere.
The White House, the Federal Reserve, or both lending their
weight to support of such legislation, but there would likely be some
reluctance to do so in light of the present political stalemate. I
presume that the best answer here rides on (1) how close to
consideration and passage such legislation might be, relatedly (2) how
likely it would be that the White House or Fed’s support would tip
the balance, and (3) how costly to the White House or Fed its support
for the legislation would be in the event of failure to pass, or perhaps
even in the event of success in passage. 70
g. “Bankruptcy-Remoteness” Reform
A discussed above, most existing securitization vehicles arrange
in a variety of ways to remain “bankruptcy-remote.” They do so by
organizing as trusts, which are not “persons” entitled to file under the
Bankruptcy Code, and by covenanting out of bankruptcy via their
PSAs and other contractual arrangements. Were the Federal
Government, through one or more of its instrumentalities, to acquire
full ownership in certain securitized mortgage pools, it could of
course change these arrangements.

70. Passage would quickly result in such salutary effects as to diminish significantly any
lingering “backlash” against White House or Fed support.
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But there would be little need, for access to bankruptcy itself
would be unnecessary in such case, in turn because there would no
longer be a creditor coordination obstacle to modification of
underlying loans. Measures like those considered above at V.A.1.c
and V.A.1.e., then, would eliminate—or rather, would moot—the
bankruptcy-remoteness obstacle as readily as they would address or
sidestep the other obstacles to loan modification considered above
and below.
h. Trust Indenture Law Reform
As noted earlier, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §
77aaa-77bbb (“TIA”) might render loan modification effectively
impossible by dint of its unanimity requirements. Such is the case if it
applies to RMBS—a question that does not appear yet to have been
litigated. Were the Federal Government to purchase such RMBS in
such manner as “bought out” all current holders who might object to
underlying loan modifications, then it would be positioned to sidestep
the TIA just as to sidestep existing PSAs as discussed supra, Part
V.A.1.c. Absent a bold move of that sort, however, the White House,
the Fed, or both might wish to propose, or to lend their support to
others’ such proposals, to amend TIA—at least prospectively.
i. Internal Revenue Code Reform?
As discussed above at Part IV.A.1.i., the IRS now understands its
enabling act in a manner that no longer effectively prohibits loan
modifications on pain of back-tax penalization. As also noted there,
however, there might be some continuing unclarity, and attendant
risk aversion, where the changes’ precise significance is concerned.
The White House and other concerned Federal Government parties
might wish to conduct or support some measure of further study with
a view to ensuring that no parties who would otherwise engage in
loan modification efforts are holding off for fear of adverse tax
consequences.
j. Accounting Standards Reform?
As noted above at Part IV.A.1.j., current accounting standards
condition the off-balance sheet status of mortgage loans, from
originators’ point of view, upon originators’ relinquishment of
“control” over the loans that they sell. For an originator who
continues on as a Servicer to engage in loan modification
negotiations, however, might be to exercise “control” in the opposite
sense, notwithstanding some SEC opinion letters to the contrary.
Uncertainty about the matter, in any event, might well be dissuading
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some who would otherwise engage in loan modification negotiations
from doing so. The White House or other concerned Federal
Government parties might, then, wish to propose, or to lend support
to, efforts by the SEC or others to ensure final clarity on this matter.

2.
Encouraging Expedition of Fair, Efficient, and Reliable
Foreclosure Proceedings
As noted above, impediments to the expedition of fair, efficient,
and reliable foreclosure proceedings also impede the maximization of
mortgage loan value received (and remitted), and hence impede
mortgage loan EV-maximization. I allude to foreclosure here to
preserve the structure of this Article, which aims among other things
to show the interrelations between interests. For fuller treatment of
means to address obstacles to satisfaction of this interest, however,
please see infra, Part IV.C.
B. MAXIMIZING MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE REMITTED
As noted earlier, the interest of Borrowers in fulfilling their loan
obligations as best as they can is simply the flip side of the interest of
Investors in being repaid to the fullest extent possible. Obstacles to
the one interest are accordingly obstacles to the other, and measures
taken to eliminate, diminish, or sidestep those obstacles accordingly
redound to the interests of Investors and Borrowers alike.
ENCOURAGING EXPEDITION OF FAIR, EFFICIENT, AND
C.
RELIABLE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
Because impediments to the expedition of fair, efficient, and
reliable foreclosure (I.A.C.) where mortgage loans simply cannot be
repaid or restructured are rooted in complexities, as well as inter- or
intra-state inconsistencies, in real property law, commercial law, and
related agency law regimes, means of addressing these obstacles take
the form of efforts to simplify and harmonize these regimes.
Efforts to facilitate more smoothly functioning foreclosure
proceedings probably should be distinctly secondary to efforts aimed
at facilitating more EV-maximizing loan modification, as discussed
above through Part IV.A.1. There is much more value that is apt to
be salvaged by the latter means, than there is loss apt to be avoided
by the former means. Moreover, the Federal Government is much
more able, by dint of the tools at its disposal, to act to real and
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salutary effect along lines suggested through Part V.A.1., than it is to
make much difference to (remarkably slow moving) commercial, local
real estate, and agency law reform efforts currently underway. For as
will emerge below, these latter efforts are not new, and thus far seem
stalemated in ways that the Federal Government seems unlikely to be
able to do much to break.

1. Simplifying and Harmonizing Property Law Regimes?
As observed above in Part IV.C.1., there are significant crosscutting differences among, and even within, states where the real
property laws governing mortgage foreclosures and, in some cases,
deficiency judgment procedures are concerned. Interstate divergence
presumably increases transaction costs borne by securitized mortgage
pools that hold mortgages from multiple differing jurisdictions; more
agents and more legal research is needed in such case to pursue
Intrastate divergence likely increases not only
foreclosure.
transaction costs of that sort, but considerable uncertainty as well, in
that one can no longer reliably predict, in such case, how foreclosure
and related proceedings will unfold within particular counties or
courts.
The transaction costs are regrettable, though not necessarily
unwarranted insofar as state responsibility for real property law—an
instance of Interest II.A.6.—has long been a fundamental feature of
our federalism. The uncertainty, on the other hand, is not only
regrettable, but seemingly unwarranted as well; our union is a
federation of states, not local courts. It is not clear, however, that the
Federal Government can, or ought, to do much about these things.
The Federal Government can justifiably and at relatively little
political risk lend its moral support and expertise to law-simplification
and—harmonization efforts initiated by such organizations as the
American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the Uniform Law Conference
(“ULC”). Likewise, the Federal Government could purpose these
organizations to take up such efforts. But since these groups have
long been considered the primary agents in such efforts, a Federal
Government party would be taking on considerable political risk
were it to attempt too aggressively to “push” such efforts when these
organizations are reluctant, or to “end-run” around them when they
are recalcitrant. Additionally, a Federal Government party could
persuade Fannie and Freddie to employ their conditionality leverage
in the interest of more uniformity in this area.
These observations seem especially apt in light of two particular
considerations.
First, law-simplification and law-harmonization
efforts in the areas now under discussion have been long underway
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yet do not seem to be making much headway; it is difficult to see how
the Federal Government might change that.
The second
consideration is in the nature of a recollection—namely, how readily
a Federal instrumentality might render the need for law reform less
pressing in any event, simply by taking measures of the kind
considered in the previous Subsection in connection with facilitating
EV-maximizing mortgage loan modifications.
Since the latter lies more clearly within the Federal Reserve’s
and other Federal instrumentalities core expertise and the effective
range of their policy tools, while also apt to preserve the most value,
and the former is rather more peripheral to these instrumentalities’
expertise and ability, while also not very promising as a near-term
solution, it would seem that the Federal Government would do best
to focus on Part V.A.1. efforts, while simply endorsing but not
spending significant resources upon the Section V.C. efforts that I
now turn to elaborating.
a. Reforming Judicial Foreclosure Regimes?
As noted in Part IV.C.1.a., about 20 states permit judicial
foreclosure alone, which is generally a very time consuming process
with a good bit of idiosyncratic variation from court to court even
within states. As also noted there, however, it isn’t clear that this
form of process, or that these features of the process, are
unwarranted in light of the values at stake. People’s capacity to stay
in their homes is one such value. State and perhaps even local
autonomy in determining how best to vindicate that value is another.
Finally, process-responsiveness to the idiosyncratic differences
perhaps likely to be present from foreclosure case to foreclosure case
might be another such value. It is not clear to me that there is some
countervailing value that is so much more pressing than those values,
and that lies so squarely within the Federal Government’s jurisdiction
and expertise, as to warrant the Federal Government’s taking a firm
position in respect of foreclosure processes in the judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions.
b. Reforming Nonjudicial Foreclosure Regimes?
As noted above in Part IV.C.1.b., about 30 states permit “power
of sale” or “nonjudicial” foreclosure instead of or in addition to
judicial foreclosure. While nonjudicial disclosure is generally more
streamlined and brisk than its judicial counterpart, there is
nevertheless some variation among and, in some cases, even within
states where notice and evidentiary requirements, as well as legal
presumptions, are concerned.
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The Federal Government could, at little political risk, at least
encourage efforts to bring greater uniformity in respect of these
matters within state. To push for it across states, however, seems to
implicate the same calculus as that noted in the immediately
preceding Part, V.C.1.a. Moreover, the Uniform Law Conference has
repeatedly promulgated and advocated uniform nonjudicial
foreclosure acts, all to virtually no avail. These include the Model
Power of Sale Foreclosure Act of 1940, which was never adopted by
so much as a single state, and the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act of 2002, which has fared no better.
c. Taking a Stand on Statutory Redemption Rights?
As noted above, about 22 states—principally but no solely those
that employ judicial foreclosure—afford “statutory redemption”
rights upon mortgagor/debtors and, in some cases, lienholders as well.
These afford those who have been foreclosed upon the opportunity to
regain their properties under certain conditions. Their principal
effect is to prolong the foreclosure process yet further than as
described above in Subparts IV.C.1.a. and V.C.1.a., and presumably
therefore to add an additional degree of uncertainty, via nonfinality,
as well. For essentially the same reasons as those adduced in
connection with judicial foreclosure itself in Part V.C.1.a. above,
however, this subject does not seem to me something upon which the
Federal Government would wish to take a position—other than the
usual endorsement of intra-state consistency so far as possible.
d. Taking a Stand on Deficiency Judgments?
As noted above in Part IV.C.1.d., about 25 state permit postforeclosure “deficiency judgments” against mortgagor/debtors whose
foreclosed homes do not bring sufficient revenue to cover the
entireties of their outstanding obligations to their creditors. Differing
states impose differing requirements upon these. Allowing such
judgments, of course, tends to be mortgage loan EV-maximizing.
Differences among states in respect of restrictions upon deficiency
judgments, for their part, represent higher transaction costs for
securitization trusts holding mortgage notes relating to properties in
differing states.
The Federal Government could advocate for more extensive
allowance of deficiency judgments across the union, and greater
uniformity across states where the contours of deficiency judgment
are concerned.
Yet, for reasons adduced in the immediately
preceding several Subparts, this does not seem to me an area in which
the Federal Government should opine. The issues involved are quite
sensitive, as well as traditional state concerns. Meanwhile, more
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value seems apt to be preserved by means of the sort considered
above, Section V.A.1., in connection with facilitating mortgage loan
modification. And since the latter means seem to be well within
Federal Government expertise and capacity, they are better avenues
down which the Federal Government might travel yet further than it
already has.

2. Simplifying and Harmonizing Commercial Law Regimes?
As discussed in Part IV.C.2., the nonuniformity across and within
states of current commercial law regimes have played some role not
only in determining bizarre and unpredictable caselaw, but also
certain practices brought to light in recent “robo-signing” scandals.
Here, the Federal Government could do some real good, at minimal
political risk. This is partly because commercial law is less likely to
strike citizens viscerally as a province of state law alone; there is, after
all, a Congressional Commerce Power. The lower degree of risk here
also stems from the fact that there seems little to no compelling
reason for complexity and variety, in the way that there is, to some
degree, in the case of real estate law.
a. Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 Reform?
As noted above at Part IV.C.2.a., considerable confusion attends
(1) whether modern mortgage-related promissory notes qualify as
“negotiable” under UCC Article 3 and hence fall within that Article’s
ambit, and, to somewhat lesser degree (2) who actually has standing
to enforce an Article 3-cognizable promissory note. These confusions
owe partly to (1) less than perfect clarity over precisely what qualifies
or disqualifies a promissory note as negotiable, and (2) what seems an
unfortunate tendency on the part of Article 3 to employ terms that
are more or less synonymous in ordinary English usage—e.g.,
“holder,” “owner,” “bearer”—to designate very different legal
concepts.
The stakes involved in the negotiability question are high.
Negotiable notes are transferrable only by physical delivery, which
fact accounts for some of the temptations succumbing to which led
some Servicers into “robo-signing”-type infractions. Negotiable notes
also implicate the “holder in due course” doctrine, pursuant to which
mortgagor/borrowers are left unable to raise origination fraud as a
defense in foreclosure.
The mentioned unclarities in connection with which so much is at
stake seem to be altogether rectifiable problems. There would not
seem to be any significant political risk entailed by the Federal
Government’s lending its support to the cause of bringing greater
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clarity to Article 3 on the mentioned points. The recent PEB
Memorandum on proper understanding of Article 3 is helpful in
respect of point (2) just above, 71 but does not seem to have anything
to say about point (1). Moreover, better than a memorandum to
assist with point (2), it seems to me, would be simplification and
clarification of the Article itself.
I recommend that the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with ALI
and the ULC, conduct empirical research of the sort noted to be
lacking above in Part IV.C.2.a., and act to instigate and further a
process to revise Article 3. In addition to attending to points (1) and
(2), it seems that this process ought also to involve serious
consideration of (3) whether the concept of negotiability—the
entailments of which stand in the way of an efficient electronic
mortgage note transfer system while also risking serious injustice to
defrauded mortgagor/borrowers—makes sense at all anymore where
mortgage-related promissory notes are concerned. 72
b. Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Reform?
As noted above in Part IV.C.2.b., all mortgage-related
promissory notes, as well as their associated mortgages, implicate
Article 9 of the UCC irrespective of whether they implicate Article 3.
Because the term “security interest” used in Article 9 refers both to
the saleable payment right associated with a securitized promissory
note and to the collateralized property that secures the note
obligation via the mortgage, confusion plagues many foreclosure
proceedings. Some have erroneously come to believe that mortgages
are severable from their associated notes, and in consequence have
erroneously come to believe that foreclosure cannot be had absent
physical possession of a mortgage deed. That in turn has afforded yet
another incentive to Servicers to engage in practices of the sort
brought to light in some of the recent “robo-signing” scandals.
To solve this problem, all that would need be done is either or
both (1) to employ different terms of art for rights to payment and
rights to underlying collateral, rather than employing the term
“security interest” to designate both; and (2) to add language to the
text of Article 9 simply stating that in the case of mortgages and
mortgage-related promissory notes, “the mortgage [does indeed
always] follow the note,” as has been the case since well before

71. See supra note 56, and associated text.
72. See supra, Part IV.C.2.a, for more on why it might not.
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codification of this common law doctrine in the UCC. Little to no
political risks are involved in these efforts.
c. Agency Law Clarification or Reform?
As noted above in Part IV.C.3., there appears to be considerable
variation not only across, but also more troublingly within, states
concerning who may act as an agent on behalf of a mortgage loan
holder seeking (1) enforcement of a mortgage-related promissory
note, and (2) foreclosure on the mortgage that secures it. These
differences have especially plagued efforts by MERS of late to pursue
foreclosures on behalf of its members.
Interstate variation of this sort occasions higher transaction costs,
but intrastate variation occasions something worse—uncertainty.
Also, there is no particularly compelling reason for intrastate
variation on agency in connection with mortgage foreclosure, while
there is also probably less such reason for interstate variation in this
field than there is, say, for interstate variation in respect of real
property law.
I tentatively conclude that the Federal Reserve, in conjunction
with the SEC, could encourage and lend its assistance to efforts at
making incremental reform to the law of agency through the
Restatement process. It would not seem difficult to develop a simple
and uniform standard pursuant to which the conditions that must be
met for a putative agent to receive actual authority to engage in noteenforcement and mortgage-foreclosure proceedings on behalf of a
noteholder were made plain.
LOWERING MORTGAGE FINANCE- REFINANCED.
FORECLOSURE-RELATED TRANSACTION COSTS

AND

As catalogued throughout Part IV.D., the factors that impede the
interests off maximizing loan value (Interests II.A.1. and II.A.2.) and
expeditious foreclosure (II.A.3.) also present significant transaction
costs of the sort that Investors, Borrowers, and presumably the
Federal Government would prefer to see minimized. All measures
considered and recommended above in Sections V.A. and V.C. will
act to lower these transaction costs too. Insofar as these are
significant—a matter that could do with empirical study but also a
matter in connection with which the probabilities seem obvious—the
recommended measures look to be all the more forcefully justified.
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VI. CONCLUSION: TWO RIDERS ARE APPROACHING, THE
WIND BEGINS TO HOWL 73
My hope is to have identified literally all factors that presently
pose substantial threats to the recovery and longer term health of our
primary and secondary mortgage and residential real estate markets.
I hope also to have drawn out the way in which many of these factors
mutually interact and complement one another in challenging the
mentioned recovery and longer term health. And, finally, I hope to
have adequately highlighted the various interests in terms in which
“recovery” and “health” are best understood, and the various parties
in interest whose interests and, therefore, incentives are implicated in
the inquiry.
The American public has a good deal of work to do if we are to
bring full recovery and longer term health to the mortgage and real
estate markets, hence to the broader financial economy and the yet
broader macroeconomy. On the other hand, the task need not be as
daunting as the sheer inclusiveness of the foregoing Parts might seem
to suggest. For, in the first place, there is a remarkable degree of
convergence and mutual complementarity among the particular
interests and parties in interest that I have identified. In the second
place, some of the measures that I have provisionally assessed can
yield such substantial effects as to render other such measures less
urgently needed in the short-to-medium terms even if well advised in
the longer term.
If there is one family of such measures that “dominates” all
others in importance, I think that it is that family of measures I
proposed as the present crisis first grew acute in 2008, 74 on the basis
of things I had written about earlier in the decade in connection with
the federal home finance innovations pioneered by Presidents
Hoover and Roosevelt in the 1930s. 75 This is the family of measures
that address head-on the coordination and collective action problems
that are (1) diffusely participated market undervaluation of MBS, and
(2) diffuse creditor incapacity to negotiate all-too necessary principal
write-downs. I call these, as noted above, “controlling bloc”
73. With apologies and thanks again to Mr. Zimmerman. See supra note 1. The last line of
the work in question is “Two riders were approaching, / the wind began to howl.”
74. See, e.g., Hockett II, supra note 2, as well as sundry OpEds published during the same
period. See also Robert Hockett, Treasury’s Planned Bailout is FHA’s Bailiwick, DORF ON
LAW (Sept. 25, 2008), www.dorfonlaw.org/2008/09/treasurys-planned-bailout-is-fhas.html.
75. See, e.g., Hockett III, supra note 15, at 105–06 (developed, I now feel waves of
nostalgia in reporting, out of 2001 research paper written for Mike Graetz’s and Jerry Mashaw’s
Designing Public Institutions course at Yale Law School); Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock
Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and “Ownership Societies”, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 865, 924–26 (2007).

HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2013

SIFTING THROUGH THE MORTAGE MESS

3/31/2013 11:29 PM

419

measures. They promise to work precisely by dint of their replacing
collectively diffuse stakeholders, who are subject to all of the
coordination and collective action challenges discussed above, with
concentrated collective agents.
One such measure, as proposed earlier, would involve federal
agencies’ purchasing controlling blocks of MBS themselves. That
would have been particularly well advised in 2008, at the time that I
advocated it, but could still work now were the appropriate federal
instrumentalities—be it Congress or, more plausibly right now, the
FHFA—to recognize the potential and act upon it.
Another such measure would involve federal or, more likely in
view of that “collective action problem” which is the U.S. Congress
itself these days, state or municipal exercises of the eminent domain
power to the same end. Municipalities—especially some of those in
the so-called “sand states” that the bubble and bust hit most
forcefully—have particularly compelling interests preventing mass
foreclosure. For it is difficult to imagine a more calamitous hit to
their property values, tax bases, and freedom from familial distress,
blight, and crime, than a concentrated set of local foreclosures.
If a municipality can condemn physical property to remove
people from their homes in the name of shopping mall development
as did the City of New London in Kelo v. City of New London, 76 how
much more apt to pass Due Process muster must it be for a town to
condemn mortgage-backed promissory notes in the name both of
keeping people in their homes and maximizing value for the noteholders themselves? All that would seem to prevent this right now is
a want of sufficient imagination and knowledge on the part of those
collective agents best situated at present to act in the name of us all—
the municipalities.
Solution to a collective action problem typically requires a
collective agent. 77 Only some such agent’s taking charge will enable
all parties in interest to the many troubled post-bust mortgages out
there to enjoy the benefits of post-bust EV-maximization. For the
time being, the best situated such agents appear to be the
municipalities. There, then, is the locus of decision at which I believe
the next important steps will be taken. They, along with investors
who might partner with them in order to provide up-front financing
for condemnation awards, jointly constitute the “two riders”
referenced in the caption above.

76. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
77. See Hockett II, supra note 2, at 1290–91; Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, at
6–7. See also Robert Hockett, How to Bypass the Impasse: Public-Private Partnering for ValueSalvaging Mortgage Condemnation (working paper) (on file with the author).
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Indeed, since first drafting this Article, the author has made
significant headway, in some cases in collaboration with old friends
and colleagues in the financial services industry, in fostering
municipal and investor interest in this idea. Since Reuters first
reported on the emerging success of the plan in June 2012, 78 there has
been much press and other media coverage. 79 There has also been
much interest shown by municipalities; 80 federal instrumentalities
including the White House, Congress, and multiple regulators; 81
housing and community advocates; 82 the ALI; 83 the ABA; 84 the
78. See Tom Braithwaite, Investors Invoke Law to Solve Housing Crisis, FINANCIAL
TIMES, June 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8017cf44-b309-11e1-83a9-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2NvOxlJqq; see also Robert Hockett, A solution for underwater mortgages: Eminent
domain, REUTERS (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/ 2012/06/19/a-solutionfor-underwater-mortgages- eminent-domain.
79. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Housing’s Last Chance?, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A21. For a
compilation of other media sources, see Articles: News and More, Eminent Domain,
http://www.eminent-domain.us/index.php/component/content/article/79-publicationscategory/
83-newsandmore (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
80. Id. See, e.g., Michael Morgan Bolton, Brockton considers plan to seize bad mortgages,
BOSTON.COM (2013), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/01/03/brocktonexplore-using-eminent-domain-seize-loans-foreclosure-crisis-city-study-loan-seizures/U1xmw
Qw706X1VhF1lUHijM/story.html.
81. See, e.g., Maxine Waters, The Housing Crisis and Policy Solutions: Should Eminent
Domain Be Used to Save Underwater Homeowners? (Sept. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/upload/Testimony-of-Robert-Hockett-11-Septemb
er-2012-Third-Round.pdf (testimony of Robert Hockett); Press Release, Rep. Waters Hosts
Panel on Eminent Domain Proposals to Seize Underwater Mortgages, (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://waters.house.gov /news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=308238; Alan Zibel, Eminent
Domain Furor Hits Capitol Hill, WSJ (Sept. 13, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/
2012/09/13/eminent-domain-furor-hits-capitol-hill/; Rep. Brad Miller, No Wonder Eminent
Domain Mortgage Seizures Scare Wall Street, AM. BANKER (July 11, 2012), http://www.amer
icanbanker.com/bankthink/eminent-domain-mortgage-seizures-terrify-wall-street-10508111.html; Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, FHFA Sends Notice to Federal Register on Use of Eminent
Domain to Restructure Performing Loans (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/24143/eminent domainpr8812f.pdf.
82. See, e.g., More from Robert Hockett on Using Eminent Domain to Solve the
Underwater Mortgage Debt Problem, PUBLIC CITIZEN CONSUMER LAW & POL’Y BLOG (Dec.
5, 2012), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2012/12/more-from-robert-hockett-on-using-emi
nent-domain-to-solve-the-underwater-mortgage-debt-problem.html;
AFR
Conference:
Principal Reduction and the Economy TODAY (June 28, 2012), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/
2012/06/afr-conference-principal-reduction-and-the-economy-thursday-june-28/;
Community
Responses to Foreclosure Crisis Conference, http://www.projectnooneleaves.org/content/
conference (Mar. 23, 2013).
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Appendix: Causal (Including “Feedback”) Roles Played by
Factors Discussed in Article

Solid arrow lines represent simple causation. Dotted arrow lines represent additive
causation. (Two items linked by dotted arrow add up together to cause next item on right,
linked-to by solid arrow.)

